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I. INTRODUCTION
Present day interest in health care is no longer limited
to that of the individual seeking our the services of the
medical profession when, and if, the' need may arise.
Societal changes, along with changes in the profession
itself, have impacted in such a way that many in the Q. S.
view the health care delivery profession as an industry unto
itself. The health care system has become one of the major
industries in terms of Gross National Product, following
construction and agriculture, and it has thus generated much
interest in the economics of its operation. From these
changes has come a new social awareness concerning this vast
industry. Nc longer does the American institution of health
care enjoy the relatively autonomous existence it was
privileged to enjoy in the past. This new social
sensitivity has lead to an atmosphere of questioning. These
questions take form at the political, the market and the
individual level. Moreover, legislative changes from the
past and current decades, such as Medicare and Medicaid,
along with spiraling health care costs, have led to real
economic questions regarding how much of the nation*s
resources society is willing to devote to obtaining good
health through medicine. To aid in finding answers to such
crucial questions, a relatively new role in the health care
profession has evolved
—
the health care economist. The
health care economist is a professional who is actively
engaged in explaining the behavior of the health care market
system and in attacking such problems as financing, pricing,
staffing , and organizing health and medical services in
this country. Their efforts are motivated towards a more
efficient and effective use of very scarce and costly

resources.
As a nation, the organization of the American health
care industry is generally fragmented. The health
profession in the private sector has been allowed to operate
after a fashion resembling free enterprise. This has led to
the evolution of a variety of formal and informal structures
or arrangements in which health care is delivered.
Therefore, the health care economist is faced with having to
address specific structures when dealing with the basic
eccnomic questions. One such structure is the Military
Health Services System (MHSS) .
Although the MHSS can be viewed as a relatively closed
system, it is not immune to the economic questions of
efficiency, effectiveness and the distribution of scarce
resources. In fact, in August of 1973, the President
commissioned the Military Health Care Study (MHCS) due to
concern in several areas, one of which was the increasing
overhead and support costs within the Department of Defense
(D0D).[1] The MHCS, constituted by representatives from
DOE, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and the
Office of Management and Budget, reported its findings in
December of 1975. These findings included: 1) Planning is
based upon historical workload rather than through
forecasted demand; 2) Historical workload planning may
result in undesirable incentives for management; and 3) The
concept of regionalization over the three separate services
has not achieved its optimal cooperative management efforts.
As a result of these and other findings, the MHCS made nine
specific recommendations, one of which was that, "Resource
programming and budgeting for the MHSS should be on a
capitatation basis."[2] This form of budgeting, frequently
referred to as Capitation Budgeting (CB) , is not an entirely
new concept in the private sector. Efforts for establishing
a prepayment mode for health care delivery have been

numerous. It is generally accepted that health care
providers operating under a prepayment mode in the private
sector have many incentives to minimize costs of the
services they render. Since CB within the MHSS will more
closely resemble a prepayment mode, the motivation for this
recommendation by the MHCS was to provide additional
endogenous cost containment incentives to further enhance
the efficiency of the MHSS in delivering health care to the
population elegible to use it. [3]
Although there is an apparent incentive within the
prepayment mode in the private sector for the providers to
reduce costs and strive for continued efficiency (e.g.
seeking the most efficient or optimal mix of services
capable of maintaining the health status of the enrolled
beneficiaries), a major question is, can this same incentive
work in the MHSS? What authority and responsibility
structures must exist? What must be the rewards and
penalties for the managers and providers? Moreover, how can
efficiency be identified, measured and reported so that
these rewards and penalties can be meted out objectively and
corrective actions taken when portions of the system are not
as efficient as possible? In other words, what form must
the management control* system take?
The crucial theme underlying the above questions is one
of performance measuring. In order to provide an
objectively sound management control structure and insure an
incentive towards efficiency, managers have a need to review
and analyze performance of subordinate managers and
providers. For health care delivery systems in general, and
the MHSS specifically, this may be a relatively difficult
process. To demonstrate the problem as it exists, first











Figure 1 - MODEL FOR MANAGEMENT CONTROL
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This simple model is an effective way of viewing
management control in a typical production process.[4] The
steps within the process are easily identified. In essence,
it merely involves the measurement of the outputs of the
system, followed with an evaluation of these measurements
against seme pre-determined standard (s). Depending upen the
result of the comparison, managers know how to proceed.
Either the outputs of the system are meeting expectations or
else an indication for corrective action may exist. If
costs were the concern, then the standards to be met might
be an expected unit cost of production. This then being the
case, with a deviation of abnormally rising cost, management
would be allerted.
There are two underlying assumptions required for this
model to work, and it is these assumptions which, in a large
part, complicate management control in the health care
sector. The two assumptions are: 1) There is an incentive
to control the costs of the production process; and 2) The
output of the system can be identified and measured. The
latter assumption requires the further assumption that a set
of standards exist.
In the rational market sector the interaction of supply
and demand forces may result in a natural incentive for
controlling the production costs. This may be true because
in the long-run, it is the efficient producer who survives
in the market place as a supplier of a given product. [5] In
the traditional health care market structure this incentive
is usually found lacking. [6] This lack stems in part from
the interaction of the professional providers' control over
both aspects of supply and demand and the ability of the
providers to pass along increased cost to the third-party
payers of health care. Since the consumer neither controls
the amount of the resources to be consumed for an illness
11

episode nor has a direct interest in the cost of those
resources, assuming some form of coverage which -minimizes
out-of-pocket costs, a perverse market situation exists.
Therefore, due in part to this imperfect market system,
there is no inherent incentive for producing health care
outputs efficiently.
Moreover, in many production processes the specification
and measurement of unit output can be relatively easily
accomplished. But due in part to the multi-product nature
of health care services and the limits of technology in
medicine, the identification and measurement of the outputs
is an extremely difficult task. To date, no adequate
methodology for measuring health care output has been
developed. ( 7 ]
This lack of a natural incentive for seeking efficient
production of health care and the inability to adequately
measure health care output results with management control
over costs within the health care system being extremely
difficult. The MHSS essentially faces these problems of
management control. However, the historical budgeting used
by the MHSS, as previously mentioned, may in fact force the
incentive problem to be relatively more pronounced. The
Composite Work Unit (CWO) has been the traditional output
measure for the MHSS. It has been demonstrated that the use
of this measure effectively goes beyond the state of a 'lack
of an incentive' to a state of a 'negative incentive' .£ 8 ]
As pointed out by the MHCS, historical workload budgeting
has been capable of fostering over utilization in the MHSS.
The CWU is composed of the following weighted index:
CWO
/(OBD) ];
= [ (10) X (TA + TB)/(OBD) ] + (ADPL) + [ (0 . 3) X (TO)
where TA = total admissions
TB = total births
12

03D = operating bed days
ADPL = average daily patient load
TO = total outpatient visits
Thus, using the CWU in the historical workload budgeting may
have the following effect. It can be seen that the
inpatient represents a much higher value to the hospital
manager than the outpatient visit. Therefore, in the
interest of insuring adequate operating funds for future
periods, the incentive may be to admit the patient rather
than treat him or her on an outpatient basis. Thus, it may
not be in the interest of the manager to seek the most
efficient level of care for the patient, assuming the same
effectiveness of care at either level. This incentive to
'over-use' services is the form of the negative incentive.
Therefore, in adopting C3 within the MHSS, the need for
management control will still exist. Based upon the above
discussion, it may be seen that for successful operation,
the MHSS needs to identify a measure of performance, an
indicator, whereby the appropriate subset of inputs-outputs
of the system can be measured while at the same time be
applied in such a fashion as to provide an incentive for
managers and providers to seek the efficient production of
health care services.
Thus, the remainder of this thesis will be aimed towards
that end. First, a review of some of the research into
reimbursement schemes and health care performance measures
will be presented. The purpose of this review is to
identify some of the problems associated with measuring
hospital productivity and to identify what, if any,
successful methodology may have been adopted. Following
this, a brief review of the current MHSS will be presented
in order to highlight the significant structural
13

relationships which must be considered when addressing
incentives within the system. Next, a discussion of an
hypothesized MHSS structure will be given in order to
develop the necessary changes which will complement both
Capitation Budgeting and an incentive mechanism. Finally,
the last section will be a discussion of possible
applications or problems with application of the methods
discussed within the MHSS.
14

II. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS FROM THE LITERATURE
A. INTRODUCTION
The previous discussion has revealed the necessity for
some form of measurement of the activities within the MHSS.
Moreover, for objective management control, this measurement
should provide an incentive for management which motivates
efficiency. This section will discuss several forms of
productivity schemes, performance indicators, and incentive
mechanisms designed within a general framework of
performance measurement, evaluation and analysis, and
incentive for corrective action. More specifically, an
analysis of a selected sample of reimbursement schemes
designed to provide a cost reduction incentive will be
presented, followed by a discussion of indices used for
measuring performance as related to cost, case-mix measures
as a methodology, a suggested output measure entitled a
Synthesized Case, along with a short discussion of a current
proposed methodology being developed for implementation in a





To begin, Medicare with its attendent cost increases
and concerns over inappropriate (inefficient) use by other
third party payers aided in the focus of a great deal of
attention on the methods of reimbursement for medical
services rendered and how these methods might be used as an
incentive to reduce, or at least contain, costs and more
fully utilize health care resources. In general, these
incentive reimbursement schemes are financial plans aimed at
rewarding the low cost producer and penalizing the high cost
producer. Incentive reimburesement plans have specific
objectives which are generally, as pointed out by Eeldstein,
to minimize the cost of hospital care for given levels of
care, or else, to minimize the cost of an episode of
illness.[9] Ideally, the model to strive for would be one
that would motivate both objectives. However, in reality,
the achievement of both may not occur.
When a system seeks to reduce the cost of hospital
care, the emphasis is on efficiency. Institutional costs may
be reduced by savings in the use of resources, people and
equipment. For example, one of the reported benefits of the
Kaiser-Permanente system is the "beds not built", and
consequently, "not staff ed ".[ 10 ] Accordingly, this has a
major impact on total system costs. Although this may have
some effect upon the cost of an episode of illness, a cost
reduction of an episode of illness speaks more to the level
of care provided and the effectiveness of the resources
used. Again using Kaiser-Permanente as an example, the
16

comparatively shorter length of stay for an episcde of
illness impacts upon the cost of that episode as well as
upon total system costs. However, effectiveness, in part,
connotes the quality of care which generally cannot be
measured or evaluated with the precision necessary in
financial or cost system of which reimbursement systems are
necessarily comprised. Therefore, the primary focus is on
the efficient use of resources, the measurement of
production, and how these measures can be used as incentives
to reduce the total institutional costs, assuming quality
controls are incorporated and active.
In most cases, incentive reimbursement provides
rewards for either the process of care or the direct output
of care. Examples of process incentives include rewards for
establishing institutional systems such as utilization
review, management by objectives, or for such data
collection activities as subscribing to PAS or HAS. It is
believed that such undertakings will lead to reduced costs.
On the ether hand, direct output incentives reward the
institutions (or penalize them) based upon the final output,
i.e., the services or activities rendered as measured by
cost, wherein cost is used as the measure of output of a
given quality of care. Rewarding or penalizing institutions
upon the measurement of output is similar to the incentives
which drive the economy in the private sector where rewards
are related to the prices and costs of production. It may
be assumed that institutional factors such as enumerated
under process incentives would also be present in a system
that rewards direct output (e.g. utilization review etc.).
In general, the aim or the objective of
reimbursement schemes seems to be to achieve an effect on
the long-run performance of institutions. A good explanation
of this concept is provided by Feldstein in his previously
referenced article. Economic theory and empirical research
17

posits a U-shaped average cost curve for industries,






















- LONG-RUN AND SHORT -RUN AVERAGE COST CURVES
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The average cost curves represent average cost per
unit, however the unit may be measured. In Figure 2, the
average cost is specifically that of the cost per patient
day. In reference to Figure 2, both the long-run average
cost curve (LRAC) and the short-run average cost curves
(SRAC) are defined as follows. SRAC are for periods in which
not all of the components of hospital costs can be changed,
e.g., size of facility or scale of plant, while the long-run
is that time period in which all components of a system,
including size of plant or facility, can be altered. At any
point in time, however, a hospital is operating on a
specific SRAC curve which may have various positions
relative to those of other hospitals (see Figure 3).
Figures 3A and 3B show two possible comparative sets
of SRAC/LRAC "envelopes" for different hospitals. When
comparing hospitals, it is important to note that they may
be operating at the same level of output (0 of Figure 3A)
1
yet have different SRAC curves. The disparity between the
SRAC of separate facilities, even for the same level of
output, might be explained by different patient mix,
different levels of quality, or different levels of
efficiency in production. It may well be, for v example, the
case that two separate facilities are both as efficient as
is possible, but each of the facilities has a different case
mix for which it is equipped and staffed, and hence, each
has a different SRAC. This may be amplified by Figure 3B
which shows two facilities with different LRAC curves. At
level of output , facility two is at its minimum cost
(point A) whereas facility one would be operating at the
decreasing portion of its LRAC curve (point B) . However, as




ceases to be the low cost facility and is now operating on
the increasing portion of its LRAC curve (point C) whereas
facility one is now operating at its minimum (point D) . 2ach
facility has a different composition of equipment and staff
depending upon the patient mix it encounters or its specific
mission (i.e., a specialty hospital). Therefore, each
facility is relatively more efficient at different levels of
output because each is involved with a different set of
circumstances and on a different LRAC curve. In a given
geographic region, there may be facilities operating at, a
specific level of output (see Figure 4) . At level , both
facilities are operating on relatively higher cost positions
of their LRAC curves. Optimally, both facilities could








Figure 4 - COMPARISON OF LONG-RUN AVERAGE COST CURVES
21

As these models are explained, the basic method of
relative reimbursement is to set the reimbursement price
according to the average of the average costs of all
hospitals in the geographic region (e.g., see the ASRAC
curve of Figure 3A) , thus rewarding the hospitals operating
below the mean and penalizing those operating above it. If
hospitals are high cost because they are operating on the
increasing portion of their LRAC curve (see in Figure 2)
,
then a lessor payment would force them to reduce their
services (in the long-run, maybe reduce the size cf the
facilities.) If The hospitals are operating on the
decreasing portion of their LRAC curve (see in Figure 2)
they may have to change their services, stop offering their
services at the same prices, or expand output to where the
cost per visit falls. If differences in rates are not due
to positions on the LRAC curve as in Figure 3A, there may be
differences in efficiency which, it is hoped, would cause
the high cost facility to seek greater efficiency or be
forced to contract its services, or it may be due to case
mix which requires adjustment by some factor. (This problem
is discussed more specifically below)
.
It appears that most reimbursement schemes are some
modification of the above general theme. They generally use
average cost as a measurement relative to other hospitals or
to one individual hospital over time, although the specific
unit used in the measurement is often quite different.
Examples of units used may be cost of a patient day, the
length of stay (some systems use a declining reimbursement
for increased length of stay), or direct and variable costs.
Whatever unit may be specifically used or measured, it
generally provides an incentive to strive for increased




2. full Cost Functions
J. R. Lave, L. B. Lave and L. P. Silverman provide
an alternative to the use of average costs.[11] Their
proposed approach is a rather sophisticated model which
estimates a full cost function for any given facility
(ignoring outpatient costs) . Given specific data about a
hospital, (e.g., disease categories, occupancy rate, length
of stay, SMSA and teaching committment are a few of the
parameters) , their cost function will estimate a total cost
which becomes the amount reimbursed. The facility is
rewarded by a portion of what their actual cost is below the
estimated cost, and they are penalized by a portion of what
their actual cost is above the estimated cost.
Seward and penality provide the incentive which
motivates the primary objective of efficiency regardless of
how the reimbursement scheme may be constructed.
3 • Statistical Analysis Of In cent. ive Reimbursement
Mark V. Pauly and David F. Drake studied the effect
of four different methods of reimbursement schemes employed
by Blue Cross plans in the relatively homogeneous states of
Illinois, Indiana, Michigan and Wisconsin. [ 1 2 ] Their
purpose was to discover if different methods of payment and
incentive schemes would affect the economic behavior of
hospitals (effect of third party methods) . Their conclusions
were that there were few short-run indications of
significance which would either support or challenge their
null hypothesis which was that reimbursement schemes have no
effect on the economic behavior of hospitals. However, the
long-run indications did challenge the null hypothesis and
23

seemed to indicate that there was an effect on long-run
performance.
4 . Some Objectio ns To The Use Of Incentive
BgiS^ur sement
Even with the above indications, the widespread use
of reimbursement schemes designed around some form of
comparative average cost or comparative productivity has not
been generally accepted. Objections have been raised
regarding the use of either the specific methodology or
incentive reimbursement schemes in general. One such
objection is the question of who should subsidize the cost
of education, training and research. Those raising the
objections might insist that the current sick should net be
forced to tear the cost of these activities, thereby
concluding that the more appropriate subsidy would be
provided frcm a separate source of funds (e.g., taxes or
endowments) . Moreover, it is extremely difficult to separate
the portion of the cost of an episode of illness, or illness
in general, which is attributable to education and research.
Thus, the issue as it is raised presents a seemingly
unresolvable paradox. That is, it is generally understood
that education and research costs may force the average unit
costs to be higher than the same type of care rendered in
the absence of these inputs and thus, those institutions
would appear to be relatively less efficient. Yet, if the
patient is not charged for these resources (nor the
institution reimbursed for the cost of these resources) the
average cost per unit might appear to be the same as another
institution; moreover, that portion of care received by the
patient as a result of the training (research) is "free" to
him. But, if the patient is charged for the care received,
then the institution, under such and incentive reimbursement
plan, is penalized for rendering the care and may not
2U
V
receive full cost reimbursement.
Another paradox concerns applying the rewards in
light of current costs when these costs will provide future
benefits. For example, it may be that to provide for a more
efficient and effective system in the future, a given
hospital might require that current costs rise abnormally.
For example, if a facility were operating on the decreasing
portion of its LRAC curve, and the associated SRAC curve,
and foresaw the possibility of reducing the cost of caring
for its catchment area population by increasing the physical
size of its facility or adding capital equipment necessary
to allow the expansion through derived demand generation, it
may need to spend more current dollars to save many more
dollars later. However, if that same facility was to be
penalized substantially because of these costs, then the
incentive would tend to be not to develop the more efficient
long-run system because of the short-run penalties. Thus,
the argument is that the restriction would merely become a
constraint upon effective management in a dynamic framework.
Other objections have been expressed regarding the
effects of incentive reimbursement upon patient care. It has
been suggested that penalizing the higher cost institutions
would perhaps result in adverse effects upon current patient
care, given that previous costs were in the best interest of
the patients. Another issue raised is the question of
collusive arrangements
.[ 1 3 ] If reimbursements schemes were
based upon mean average costs of all hospitals in a given
locale, the collusive arrangement need not be formal or
spoken. If all hospitals in the area allowed their average
costs to rise at the same rate they could perhaps maintain a
narrow dispersion (relatively small variance) , and still let
costs rise faster than the economy as a whole. Therefore, it
could be proposed that this kind of reimbursement scheme
would provide an incentive to either not seek to control
25

costs, or else to allow average costs to rise. For example,
by using the usual and customary charge as a means of
prescribing future reimbursements, physicians and hospitals
may have the incentive to allow their average charges to
rise. This, of course, is not accomplished through a formal
or stated conspiracy; instead, it is the result of the
individual actions of the managers and/or providers simply
acting in their own individual self interests. The final
result then is, by allowing thier individual usual and
customary charge to rise, collectively, the overall average
charge for health care services will rise.
C. INDEX APPLICATION FOR EFFICIENCY MEASUREMENT
1 • Indices In G ener al
The above discussion of reimbursement schemes aimed
towards providing incentives relative to the efficient
production of health care services assumes a comparability
between providers performance and/or a comparability of
performance to a standard. One approach for providing a
basis for comparison is the hospital cost index. This index
approach may take a variety of forms, depending upon the
specific purposes for which it is developed or the data from
which it is developed.
In general, the index is usually a ratio, or formula
which expresses the ratio of one quantity to another. In
its most ideal form, a hospital cost index is one that can
accurately reflect the amount of inputs necessary to produce
a given level of outputs. But, in part, because of the
difficulties associated with measuring the outputs of the
health care system ?s previously discussed, most indices
26

have had tc rely upon proxy measures for establishing a
basis for comparison. Moreover, because of the
dissimilarities in health care facilities, such as the level
of available services, quality of the inputs, or patient
characteristics and case mix, a variety of models are
developed wherein adjustments for the differences are made.
This adjustment reduces the measure to some comparable unit
or base. In the absence of these specific adjustments, the
methodology employed is to group facilities according to
some scheme of classification, such as bed size, capacity of
services, numbers of training or teaching programs, etc., to
provide the basis for comparability.
As was stated, indices are developed for a variety
of purposes. In general, the aim is to be able to identify
a ranking of hospitals relative to cost and thereby identify
the differences in cost or charges, or else they are used to
identify the portion of costs attributable to inflation.
2. Variable Cost Insurance
For example, Newhouse and Taylor have proposed a
Variable Cost Insurance (VCI) in order to 'expense rate'
hospitals to refelct their relative rate of charges. [ 1 4] In
the expense rating of hospitals, their aim is to increase
X-efficiency and reduce the subsidy effect of hospital
insurance. Their hospital index takes the form of:
(2) E (i) = V(TR AR )/(TR AR );
^ ij ij i 3
th
where: E(i) = expense rating of the i hospital
















TR = total revenue in the I hosDital
i
The index provides an expense rating relative to the
various hospitals which can then be compared by the consumer
of the hospital services when seeking those services.
Although the above description is not intended to describe
the authors' total VCI proposal, it does reflect the
construction and application of an index reflecting the
ranking of a hospital relative to its cost.
The effectiveness of the Newhouse and Taylor
proposal has been questioned
.[ 1 5 ] Morton Schnabel, as well
as others, has demonstrated that it would be possible for a
hospital to manipulate the proposed index for its own
advantage. That is, he suggests that it would be possible
for a hospital to reduce its expense rating simply by
allowing the average charge of a service to rise, granting
that the service charge was currently less than half of what
the hospitals are charging and assuming a constant demand
rate. The argument has been extended to demonstrate that
the proposal might provide the incentive for hospitals to
strive for good expense rating through case-mix
specialization in less complex cases. [16] It is suggested
that because neither the weights nor the prices are held
constant, the proposed index will not provide a stabls base
for comparison between hospitals or over time.
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3. An Index For Measuring Factor Pis pro portionalit y
Another example of an index is that proposed by
Lee. [17] He suggested his model as an approach for regional
hospital planning, and it is aimed towards reducing
inefficiency through a more appropriate combination of
inputs, thus, perhaps reducing duplications,
underutilizations and waste. Lee suggests that a composite
index can be prepared for each hospital and this index will
result in an indication of the overall input combination
pattern. The composite index is simply stated as being
"...the averages of actual and optimal specialized input to
bed ratios for all disease groups. "[18] In a general sense,
Lee is proposing an index approach for reducing factor
disproportionality or the ratio of specialized inputs to
hospital beds.
Criticisms have been raised regarding Lee's
approach. For example, Whipple and Block pointed out that
Lee has neglected at least two points. [19] Basically, third
party payers have been unable to control overcapitalization
due to the use of the usual, customary and reasonable fee
guidelines by hospitals in setting prices. In doing so,
hospitals can partially determine future prices. The second
point is that Lee has failed to consider that, "...the
pricing policies of the hospitals do not accurately reflect
the cost of care in the specific disease treatment
categories. "[ 20 ] Whipple explains that pricing policies
allow an underutilized treatment center to be subsidized by
more efficient treatment centers. Thus, because of these
considerations, it may be difficult for third party payers
or planning agencies to actually control overcapitalization.
29
V
**• Weighted Average Index
A weighted average index for identifying the
relative cost effectiveness of a hospital has been suggested
by Whipple and Block. [21] The measure would be calculated
for hospitals within a grouping scheme, perhaps similar to
the Berry group. The measure might include a constant
weight derived from reported average charges of disease
categories (thus adjusting for case mix) and the authors
suggest that the relative index values would provide
management with a tool for identifying needs for cost
control.
5 • Index Me§£U£iHfl H2£ Inflation
Another concern related to hospital performance
which has prompted the development of hospital cost indices
is that of inflation. There have been two common indices in
use historically for the health care sector. [22] They are:
1) The Average Daily Service Charge (ADSC) used by the
Bureau of Labor and Statistics; and 2) The Average Cost Per
Patient Day (ACPPD) used by the American Hospital
Association (AHA) . With the advent of escalated health care
inflation, Medicare (thus, Federal) concerns and the general
overall increased awareness of health care costs, numerous
attempts have been made to capture the full effects of
inflation in the health care setting. In general, the
majority of these proposals are deficient for one reason or
another. [ 23 ]
Although these approaches may carry significance, a
relatively recent proposal suggested by Berger and Sullivan
will be discussed. [ 2U ] The authors have developed a
composite index for which the stated purpose is the
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measurement of the inflationary pressures of hospital costs
in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The index identifies
a cost threshold for determining reimbursable costs for
individual hospitals. Their model is comprised of three
primary elements: 1) A set of hospital cost categories; 2) A
set of weights for the individual cost categories; and 3) A
set of economic change indicators for measuring the
inflationary pressures of each category. The index is
designed in a manner such that it only accounts for
inflationary costs within the reimbursable costs and ignores
such things as changes in productivity, labor market supply
and demand and additions to facilities, services or
equipment.
In developing the composite index for application, a
Cost Limitation Factor (CLF) is determined according to the










CC(1) A(l,l) A(l,2) A(1,N) W(l) C(l)
CC(2) A(2,l) A(2,2) A(2.N) W(2) C(2)
CC(3) A(3,l) A(3,2) A(3,N) W(3) sin
CC(K) A(K,1) A(K,2) A(K
t
N) W(K) C(K)
Ru 1 e s :
1. A(l,l) A(l,2) ... A(1,N) - 1
CLF
A(K,1) * A(K,2) . . . A(K,N) - 1
2. W(l) W(2) + . .. W(K) - 1
3. C(l) - W(l)x[I(l)xA(K,l) * I(2)xA(1.2)+ .I(N)xA(l,N)]
C(K) - W(K)x[I(X)xA(K,l) * I(2)xA(K,2)+...+I(N)xA(K,N)]
4. CLF - C(l) C(2) C(3) ... c(K)
Legend
:
CC(1) - Cost Categories
1(1) - Economic Change Indicators (as percentage point
charges)
A(l,l)- Influence Coefficients (as a fraction)
W(l) - Cost Category Weights (as a fraction)
C(l) - Components of the Cost Limitation Factor (as
percentage points)
CLF - The Cost Limitation Factor (as percentage points)
Figura 5 - MODEL FOR COMPUTING COST LIMITATION F\CT03 <CLF>
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The CLF then becomes the cost threshold, expressed
as a percent, computed with the model in Figure 5. The
allowable costs are those explained by the CLF and the prior
year's costs, and any additional costs above the threshold
are subject to full justification prior to reimbursement.
from the above discusssion it can be seen that
hospital cost indices are performance indicators which are
used for comparing an institution's performace to a standard
and or to other similar institutions. The specific measure
used may vary according to purpose and the data base. Two
primary aims are to provide a relative ranking of the
hospitals according to hospital costs (charges) or to
identify inflationary pressures on hospital costs.
D. ADJUSTMENTS FOR CASE MIX
Whether one is discussing reimbursement schemes or
indexing methodologies, there is a general concern over
adequately measuring or allowing for case mix. Although
there are some that do not, there have been many efforts to
construct reimbursement formulas and indices which will
allow for case mix differences between hospitals. Some use
average weights, some use fixed weights, and -some group
hospitals, tut it seems that the importance of case mix
requires consideration regardless of the specific
methodology employed.
1 • Adjustment By_ jjeiqht ina I ntermediate Servi ces
It will undoubtedly enhance understanding if some
specific cases are examined. Harold A. Cohen attempted to
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develop long-run hospital cost curves which would have
useful applications in reimbursement formulas. [ 26 ] Cohen
believed it important to find measures of hospital size
based upon the numbers of intermediate services performed.
He developed a measure of service by weighting intermediate
services (e.g., X-ray treatments, deliveries, laboratory
examinations, emergency room treatments, etc.). Then, using
weights (W ) , the output of any hospital is measured by
i
summing the products of the weights and the units of any
service performed in that hospital;
k ~ k
(3) S = £ W.Q. ;
l l
k th
where S = service output in the k hospital
th
W = the weight of the i service
i
k th




Since more complex cases require a greater number of
services and proportionally greater weights, as based on
k
average costs, S is the factor that makes the necessary
case mix allowance between hospitals in the final total cost
model Cohen developes. He added other variables to the
basic model (3) above in an effort to adjust for quality
measures such as hospital accreditation and affiliations
k
with medical schools. However, in any event, S remains the
factor that adjusts for case-mix. Cohen's effort provides
one example of a methodology wherein the allowance for
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case-mix is built into a formula that has an application in
reimbursement schemes.
2 . An Evaluation Of 3 Specific Methodologies For
Measuring Case Mix
Nancy A. Roguski, in her Master's Thesis entitled An
Evaluation 2! Techniq ues for the Mea surement of Hospital
Case Mix r has provided a review of case-mix methods. [27]
Roguski has evaluated the techniques used to adjust for
case-mix differences in hospital output along the lines of :
1) Adjustments based upon the kinds of services a hospital
can produce (such as the subsequently discussed 3erry
method); 2) Using a statistical composite measure; and 3)
Adjusting patients or patient days (e.g., case-mix by
service, diagnosis, etc.) The author selected three
specific techniques; one was proposed by Feldstein, one by
Lave and Lave, and the other was proposed by John Rafferty.
She used data available from hospitals in Rhode Island to
provide a comparison against the findings of the original
investigators. She then discussed the three approaches in
relation to ease of computation, data avialability and their
reliability. Finally, she performed a stability analysis to
demonstrate how hospital case-mix may change over time.
Easically, her first analysis concerned measures
based upon eighteen diagnostic categories which were derived
from the H-ICDA code wherein average percentage of patient
and patient days for each was determined. Her second
analysis looked at patient discharges wherein patients were
grouped into five mutually exclusive categories for which
the mean percentage of each category was again determined.
The categories were based upon their particular service code





Her third analysis was that which was similar to
Rafferty's. The basic purpose was to establish an index for
comparing case-mix proportions between hospitals. The index
depends upon the establishment of a weight and is defined
by:
(4) I = ( £w.N. .)/( £>.P.)x (100)
where N = Droportion of cases of hospital j in
ij
category i
P = proportion of cases of the base
i
population in category i
R = weighting factor for category i
i
Several criteria for the weight in model (4) were
suggested. Some include average cost per case-type, number
and types of facilities needed for treatment, degree of need
for admission, or a comprehensive list of complexity values.
Roguski settled upon average length of stay for each
case-type to define the weight. Whatever criteria is used,
however, for selecting the weight, the practical value of
the index depends upon the accuracy of the weight finally
settled upcn. Moreover, since the weights, and the
resulting index itself, are dependent upon the base
population, the true comparison becomes one of an individual
hospital as compared to all hospitals comprising the base.
It may not be favorable for hospital to hospital
comparisons
.
Her basic conclusions were that there is no definite
"best case" for measuring hospital case-mix and that any




3 • CPH A Indie ies AdJii§£ij}2 H2£ Case Mix
The following two examples of indices designed to
adjust for case-mix have been developed by the Commission on
Professional and Hospital Activities (CPHA).[28] The first
example is an application of the relative value principle to
gross hospital charges and is entitled the Appendicitis
Equivalent Value Index (AEV) . The AEV is used primarily to
assess the extent to which differences in case-mix account
for the differences in average gross charges either between
hospitals or from period to period in the same hospital.
The construction of the AEV is conceptually quite simple.
For purposes of definition an appendicitis patient is an
operated patient under 20 years of age diagnosed as acute
appendicitis without peritonitis. The average charge of all
appendicitis cases so defined has an AEV of 1.00. If the
average gross charge for an illness, specifically defined,
was 160% of the average charge for appendicitis patients,
then the AEV for such patients would be 1.60. The
Commission on Professional and Hospital Activities (CPHA)
has compiled a table for statistically normal charges for
treatment in D . S . hospitals . This table, entitled the Study
of Patient Charges (S?C) was compiled from 1.1 million case
abstracts which were assigned to one of 3,510 cells, defined
by 351 diagnosis groups, five age groups, and designated as
operated or non-operated. The average charge for each 3,510
cells was then compiled. To build an AEV for a specific
hospital, the hospital's patients are assigned a cell as
defined above and each patient receives the AEV for that
cell until all N numbers of patients have been assigned an
AEV. The AEV's are then summed and divided by N. The result
is the AEV index for that hospital.
The next example, also developed by CPHA, introduces
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the 'Resource Need Unit' (RNU) which has application in
isolating the effect of case-nix in comparisons of average
charges between patient groups, hospitals, or time
periods. [29] Resource Need Units are so named because they
are designed to reflect the relative value of resources
typically needed in treating given kinds of patinets as
reflected in average charges. A RNU of 1.00 corresponds to
the average charge for all patients in the data base. A RNU
for a specific patient category, as defined by the
Commission, is egual to the average charge of matched
patients divided by the average charge for all patients in
that data base. The actual index, the Resource Need Index
(RNI) , is constructed from the sum of all the RNU's for each
patient in the desired grouping (may be hospitals) divided
by the number of patients in the group:
(5) ENI = (RNU + RNU + RNU +
1 2 3
+ RNU ) / N
N
4 • Grou£ina H2SIliii=I§ 2Q.L £.HL§.fl Mix Ad justmer.t
As final example, Ralph E. Berry, Jr., has
approached case-mix adjustment by grouping hospitals. [ 30 ]
Berry believes that perhaps the most significant analytical
or empirical challenge in the context of hospital cost and
production research is the problem of coping with product
differences. Similar to the question addressed by Cohen,
Berry attempts to discover what motivates and determines the
specific quality and complexity of services that hospitals
provide. Kis approach was to determine whether or not there
is any pattern to the specific facilities and services that
hospitals have when they have different levels of such
facilities and services. If there is a pattern, can
hospitals then be grouped according to the types of
facilities and services they have? Finally, if such grouping
3 8

is possible, does it provide insight into the case-mix
phenomenon? Berry's study seems to indicate a definite and
systematic pattern to the expansion of facilities and
services in short-term general hospitals. He concludes that
there are definite groups beginning with what he terms a
'basic service hospital'. As the hospitals add facilities
and services there is a tendency towards those services that
will enhance quality, thus 'quality-enhancing' is the second
category. The next grouping shows a tendency towards more
complexity, hence 'complex' is the third category. The
final stage of expansion occurs when hospitals add
facilities and services that essentially transform them from
inpatient institutions into community medical centers, and
this was called the 'community' category. Berry found that
by fitting hospitals into these specific groups according to
their number of facilities and services, certain
relationships began to emerge. For example, the average
length of stay was found to increase according to the type
of hospital. Mean stay was found to be shortest for the
basic service hospital and longest for the community service
hospital. Occupancy rates increased in a fashion similar to
length of stay. There were also significant differences
among the types of hospitals in terms of inputs (i.e.,
personnel, assets per patient day, capital/labor ratios
etc.). For example-, community service hospitals not only
were found to employ more labor and capital than other
groups, but they were also employing more capital per unit
of labor. These differinces in input combinations were
consistent with product differences implicit in the
groupings (e,g. case-mix) , according to Berry.
Finally, Berry found that cost per patient day was
directly related to the category of hospital. Basic service
hospitals had the lowest average cost, with each category
increasing in cost as the groupings progressed. Presuming
that different patients need a different level of care, and
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noting the relationship between cost and level of care,
Berry was led to his conclusion that the fundamental value
in his analysis was how to determine the optimal mix of
different types of hospitals rather than how tc determine
the optimal size of hospitals.
S. A SYNTHESIZED CASS AS A METHODOLOGY FOR MEASURING OUTPUT
As previously stated, a major complicating factor in the
management control for the health care sector has been the
lack of concensus regarding the proper definition of health
care output. Due to the variability of hospital facilities
and patterns of care, and the heterogeneity of their
outputs, no methodology for defining health care
productivity has been generally accepted even though there
have been several attempts. One such attempt has resulted in
the hospital product being identified as a 'Synthesized
Case' (SC) .[ 51
]
The Synthesized Case is an attempt at developing a
mathematical relationship between the factors which are
believed to quantify the variability of inputs between
hospitals and to provide a single product definition. In
doing so it was posited that inter-hospital productivity
comparisons could be made. Moreover, the methodology of the
SC allows for the inclusion of ambulatory care which is
often excluded in other hospital productivity measures.
The first step in developing the SC was to adjust for
the effects of ambulatory care upon productivity. This was
accomplished by first comparing average revenue of an
outpatient visit with that of an inpatient visit. This was
termed an 'Adjusted Case* (AC) and was defined as follows:
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(6) AC = C + (OPR / IPR)/(OPV / C)X(OPV)
= C + [ (OPR)X (C) / (IPR) ]
= C(1 + OPR / IPR)
where C = case (an admission)
OPR = outpatient revenue
IPR = inpatient revenue
OPV = outpatient visit
To aid in correcting for the dissimilarities among
hospitals, the model employs a 'Service Index' which was
developed from the cumulative growth in hospital services.
The author felt that size alone was not an adequate means of
identifying the differences to be expected from varying
hospital services. Therefore, in order to provide for a
finer adjustment of the products, or the output, Edwards
adopted an approach which has been reported earlier in the
literature. [ 32 ] Using established techniques, the original
researchers developed an index which would reflect the
cumulative effects of hospital services. This final index
was termed the General Service Index (GSI) and was
incorporated in the final model Edwards proposed. The GSI
was based upon 19 cf the 47 services listed in the American
Hospital Association Annual Survey. These 19 services were
arrayed according to a heirarchy in identification of the
value to be assigned to the GSI. For example, a value of 1
was an indication that none of the 19 services were
available (and therefore, none of the 47) while a value of 4
was given to the GSI if the hospital had an organized
Physical Therapy Service. The assumption is, if a hospital
has a given kind of service, it will also have certain other
service capabilities. The approach in developing the GSI is
not altogether dissimilar to Berry's method for grouping
hospitals which was discussed earlier. Edwards used the
findings of earlier research to justify the use of the GSI
in his final model.
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Next, factor analysis and stepwise regression analysis
were used in order to develop the productivity measure.
Three dependent variables were investigated: 1) Total
expenses; 2) Expenses per admission or case; and 3) Expenses
per AC as defined in equation (6) above. A host of
independent variables were then used, moving from total
expenses to the SC by using both linear and multiplicative
or logarithmic models. Examples of the independent variables
include the previously mentioned GSI; an Acute Care Index
(ACI) ; an Outpatient Index (OPI) ; a Long-Term Care Index
(LTCI) as well as such other things as size, location,
training programs, etc. The indices were defined by the
number of available services such as pharmacy, inhalation
therapy, psychiatric services, etc.
The result of the analysis was a model specified in the
general form cf a Cobb-Douglas function:
,023 ,007 .36*
(7) EPAC = [ (2.303) (GSI) (I?) (ONPE)
•6 0S ,0 9 .0 2 9
(FTE) (W) (P)
.0 5 ^09
(SMSA) ] / [ SB ]
EPAC = expenses per adjusted case ^
GSI = General Service Index
IP = number of residency programs + 2
ONPE = other non-payroll expenses per adjusted case
W = wage rate
P = 3 if for-profit ownership; 2 if not-for-profit
ownership SMSA = SMSA size code + 2
SB = statistical beds
FTE = fulltime equivalent personnel per adjusted case
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The model was validated with data from short-term
non-federal hospitals in Texas over three years and a sample
of all U.S. hospitals. Correlation between the estimates
and the observations ranged from a low of 0.9875 to a high
of 0.9947.
Equation (7) above was then re-written to obtain the
definition of a hospital product which results in a cost
equation for Expenses Per Synthesized Case (EPSC) and the
Sythensized Case (SC)
:
.3 6* .6 8 .0 2 9 .0 5
(8) EPSC = [ (2.303) (ONPE) (FTE) (W) (SMSA) ];
.023 .007 ,00 9
SC = [Cases (1 + OPR/IPR) (GSI) (IP) ]/[ (SB) ]
The authors of the model feel that it will capture the
heterogeniety of hospital outputs sufficiently to provide
for comparisons over rime and levels of productivity. They
further assume that volume of outpatient services, the
number of services available, hospital size and the number
of residency programs make the major contribution to the
changing nature of hospital products while the other factors
are a function of managerial style. Moreover, they feel that
the model can be used for identifying gross areas of
deviations of performance and can be applied 10
inter-hospital comparisons or for comparisons against other
posited standards. It is suggested that their model is
flexible in that some of the 'managerial' factors can be
changed to reflect judgements of the users and also feel
that a further breakdown of the 0NPE would perhaps enhance
the usefulness of their model.
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F. KAISEB-PERMANENTE COST CENTER ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEM
The Kaiser-Permanente Medical Care Program (K-P) is a
relatively closed system in the private health care sector
that delivers health care services to an enrolled group of
beneficiaries. Membership enrollement in the plan requires a
prepaid fee which entitles the beneficiaries to a specific
range and level of covered services. This enrollment fee, or
capitation rate, is a primary source for supporting the
costs of operating the system. The Kaiser-Permanente
program, to be successful, must deliver acceptable services
to its members at a competitive capitation rate. In order to
offer a competitive capitation rate, the managers and
providers in the K-P system must provide the required
services effectively and efficiently. [ 33 ] Traditionally,
the K-P program has used a historical workload approach in
developing the forecast of the hospital facility budget
which, in turn, is used to aid in setting the capitation
rates for future periods. Historically, as a total system,
they have been relatively successf ul
.[ 34 ] Just the same,
the K-P program is developing a pilot program to develop a
Cost Center Accountability System (CCAS) . There have been
four reported objectives of the CCAS; 1) The development of
standard performance measures; 2) The development of
responsibility and control at the Department/Area level; 3)
Establishment of an equitable resource allocation system;
and 4) To aid in regional coordination and monitor ing .[ 35 ]
It has been suggested that the CCAS will provide
management information in at least the five critical areas
of 1) Utilization; 2) Performance; 3) Membership; 4) Access
(backlogs); and 5) Cost. [36] Since the CCAS is currently in
the development stage, there is relatively little
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information available regarding the probable structure or
form which the pilot program will have, but an evaluation of
the objectives may give some insight insofar as what top
management in K-P may feel to be important elements of a
successful capitation structure. First, it can be seen that
K-P has suggested that a standard measure of performance is
needed. Kaiser has used such measures as doctor office
visits (D07) , bed-days per member, physician-membership
ratios, physician-staff ratios, and others in the past.
Whether these will continue to dominate in the Kaiser
management control system in the future is a matter for
conjecture. However, it may be reasonable to assume that
whatever measures are used they will be standardized in both
the collection procedures and the reporting procedures.
Second, it can be seen that Kaiser is now expressing an
interest in decentralization of responsibility and control
in contrast to their traditional centralization of these
management principals. Moreover, it may be reasonable to
assume that the historical workload approach for allocating
resources has been viewed by K-P as a less than equitable
means for allocating resources within the system. Finally,
although without much clarity, it may be seen that the
cocrdinaticn of services at the regional level has become an
important objective for the top managers of
Kaiser-Permanente. It is assumed that the development of the
CCAS in relation to the stated objectives is to enhance an
already relatively successful K-P in its effective and





Ill- INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MILITARY HEALTH
SERVICES SYSTEM
A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
The concept of management control as it is being
discussed here is only one of the several basic management
f unctions. [ 37 ] For present purposes raagement control is
defined as:
...the process by which managers assure that
resources are obtained and used effectively and
efficiently in the accomplishment of an
organizations ob jectives.[ 38
]
As alluded to in the introductory section, effectiveness
may be defined as the degree of contribution the output
makes to the objectives of an organization. The greater the
contribution, the more effective the organization. On the
other hand, efficiency is the ratio of inputs to outputs
(costs to units of production) . Thus, the greater the
amcunt of outputs produced per unit of input, other things
being egual, the more efficient the organization. It is the
latter aim which is the goal for the measurement tool being
sought for the MHSS organization in this thesis.
When discussing the data to be used for evaluating
either the effectiveness or efficiency of an organization,
the organization's management control system may be
discussed in at least two structures. [ 39 ] They are the
program structure and the responsibility structure. In an
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organization which relies upon a Planning, Programming, and
Budgeting System (PPBS), such as the Department of Defense,
these two structures may be highly interrelated, but the
basic purposes of each are discussed separately. The
discussion of the program structure will relate more
specifically to the planners and analysts wherein the full
costs of carrying out programs are emphasized in determining
which type of programs (and how much of a given program)
will best accomplish the overall goals or missions of the
organization. The discussion of the responsibility structure
will relate more to the activities to be performed within
the programs, and the coordination of the activities,
wherein controllable costs of operations are emphasized. The
interrelatedness of the two structures implys that each is
interested in both effectiveness and efficiency, but the
former has a main concern regarding effectiveness while the
latter emphasizes efficiency. Moreover, the interrelatedness
implys that the program structure may cut across the formal
responsibility lines unless programs are designed around the
responsibility structure. Thus, it follows that the program
structure should be designed such that it serves the needs
cf top management. But Anthony and Herzlinger point out
that:
In designing a responsibility structure, the needs
of the operating managers are paramount. Such a
structure must be consistent with lines of
responsibility, and this principle cannot be
compromised to meet the needs of planners. [ 40 ]
Moreover, within the program and responsibility
structures, a management control system must be considered
such as that depicted in Figure 1. As pointed out
previously, one of the basic assumptions for this model is
that an incentive for efficient production exists. Since, by
definition, the MHSS is not in the traditional market sector
(e.g. it is a non-profit organization) a natural incentive
for efficiency may not exist within the responsibility
structure. Thus, it becomes paramount that the program and
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responsibility structures must consider this lack of a
natural incentive. If true efficiency in production is being
sought, then the structure must be designed in such a
fashion as to permit a full committment by the managers and
providers to the goals of the organization. For example,
Whipple, in the Capit ation ^ Incentive Project reports, has
delt at length with this matter through a more thorough
discussion of goal congruence within an organization. [ 4 1
]
It may be that an adeguate design of these structures may
provide, or enhance, an incentive such that it will be more
conducive for a full committment of the managers and
providers to the goals of efficiency.
Thus, it will be the purpose of this section to present
a brief review of these two structures as they may relate to
the current HHSS and the way they might relate to the MHSS
under a Capitation Budgeting scheme. The current MHSS will
be discussed in an attempt to identify the strengths and
weaknesses of the management control process as it may*
relate to measurement of inputs and outputs and the
resulting incentives within the system. For contrast, a MHSS
structure will be hypothesized with the aim of highlighting
structural changes which will complement the management
control process in relation to the incentive for efficiency
which is being sought.
B. THE CURRENT MILITARY HEALTH SERVICES SYSTEM
1 . The Authority And Re spqnsibilitj Structure
First, the current MHSS structure will be examined.
Figure 6, although a gross oversimplification, may be used,
to illustrate the current CONUS-based MHSS. (The scope of
48

this thesis does not permit a more detailed analysis of the
MHSS authority and responsibility structures. However, we
note that a more detailed analysis is being provided in a































Figure $ - CURRENT CONUS-BA5ED MHSS
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In a broad sense, Figure 6 is used to to depict both
the flew of resources and the flow of authority and
responsibility. Moreover, it will be used to identify the
coordination of activities performed within the
responsibili tiy structures and over geographic regions.
Also, it will be used to discuss the information systems
wherein the data used for the PP3S and management control is
collected and reported. Within these contexts the endogenous
incentives for efficiency will be discussed.
The flow of authority and responsibility within DOD
and the MHSS ultimately begins at Level 1 in Figure 6.
Congress, as a body, and the Constitution, provide the legal
basis for operating the component elements within DOD
identified as the MHSS. Moreover, the President's Federal
Budget, a significant portion of which is the DOD budget, is
approved and authorized by Congress; thus, it is from
Congress that the MHSS costs of operations are initially
funded. Between Levels 2 and 3 of Figure 6, the chain of
authority and responsibility for the MHSS as a total system
becomes fragmented. For example, each Surgeon General has
the responsibility for programming the majority of the
health care resources for their respective uniformed
service. These programs are included as a part of their
respective Line Commander's (e.g. CNO) total package request
which is submitted to DOD to be ultimately included in the
president's budget request to Congress. Moreover, the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (ASD-HA)
programs resources for the Civilian Health and Medical
Program of the Uniformed Services benefit plan (CHAMPUS) .
Between Levels 3 and 4, in the programming process, there is
no coordination between these programs, nor is there a
requirement for such. [42] Between Levels 3, 4 and 5, within
each individual service branch, the lines of authority and
responsibility are, once again, clear cut and easily
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identified. But the final result is that, at Level 5, there
are basically four separate autonomous components within the
MHSS which are responsible for delivering health care
services to the eligible beneficiaries within Level 6. The
dotted line connecting the four components at Level 5 are
intended to represent the presently existing "cooperative"
coordination effort which has been implemented. As pointed
out by the MHCS, this coordination of efforts, to date, has
been relatively ineffective in attaining its full
potential. [ 43 ] These four separate components result in a
fragmented programming and budgeting process for the MHSS as
a whole. This is further complicated by the fact that the
health benefit plan as currently implemented allows, with
minor exception, the eligible beneficiaries in Level 6 to
seek care from any of the four components of Level 5. For
example, in some specific locations within CONUS, all four
components may be available as a source for care to the
beneficiaries within that area. Although research data has
not been reviewed in this area which would reveal the
magnitude in which this freedom of choice may impact upon
utilization, the MHCS indicates that the relative lack of
control of this demand hampers the planning for and
allocation of resources. Thus, not only may the MHSS be
identified as fragmented in its programming and budgeting
process or structure, it may be that there are areas of
overlap for providing certain health care services tc the
patients of the system. The MHCS documented xhe effects of
the current arrangement when they pointed out that
over-programming of beds has occured, along with
underutilization of certain types of services. Thus, from a
total system view, at least, there may be no endogenous
incentive and/or mechanism for seeking the optimal mix of
facilities and/or services between the four separate
components within the MHSS which would provide for a greater
efficiency cf operation. Moreover, in the absence of a
measurement technique for identification of the optimal mix
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of facilities, such as was found in Berry's proposal,
facility distribution both within and between the four
separate components of the MHSS may be further hampered.
Moreover, due to the lack of a technique, such as proposed
by Lee, the optimal sizing of hospitals or facilities may
also be hampered. Therefore, it may be seen that a
performance indicator which aids in the identification of
these relatively more efficient combination of health care
services would perhaps aid in the management control
process.
The programming process which takes place within
each component is based upon historical workload as
previously pointed out. Future resource needs are not
determined by a projected demand for health care
services
.[ 44 ] This is particularly true at Level 3 within
the structure. The basic unit of measurement upon which
historical workload is measured is the CWU. As has been
discussed, this CWU provides an ineffective , or at worst a
perverse, incentive at Level 5 within the MHSS. Since the
individual facilities are separately and automatically
budgeted, there is no endogenous incentive to seek the
optimal mix for delivering the health care needs to Level 6.
Moreover, since the CHAMPUS component is not a part
of the local manager's budget at Level 5, there may be an
incentive for him to use CHAMPUS as a subsidy. That is,
under certain circumstances or conditions, eligible
beneficiaries may be authorized to use CHAMPUS even though
the particular health care services are available from a
military facility. In these circumstances it might be to the
local manager's advantage to encourage beneficiaries to use
CHAMPUS as a source for care and thereby supplement his own
budget with this "free to him" factor input. [45]
The budgeting process at Level 5 within each
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component may not be as well coordinated with the
programming process at Level 4 as it could be. The entire
FPB process at Level 4 and above begins several months prior
to the fiscal year (FY) for which the resources are to be
budgeted. However, facilities within Level 5 may not request
their next FY budget early enough to permit inclusion in the
total package request which is submitted above Level 4.
Thus, the historical workload data upon which Level 4
operates may not be directly related to the workload data
upon which Level 5 formulates its budget request. The
incentive at Level 5 may become one which motivates the
responsible manager to request as large of a share of the
Level 4 budget that he can justify. This justification is
based, once again, upon the CWD as well as discretionary
costs (costs for which the optimum amount is not known, and,
often, not knowable) . These discretionary costs may
constitute a relatively large fraction of the Level 5 budget
request. Since there is no "scientific" way of estimating
the amount of discretionary costs, budget allocations from
Level 4 to Level 5 must be determined through a form of
negotiation. This amounts to the local manager in Level 5
convincing the central manager in Level 4 that he "needs"
the amount initially requested. This latter interaction
between Level 4 and 5 may result in another incentive which
interferes with efficiency goals. Since moral suasion is the
basis for justifying that share of the budget (discretionary
share) , the local manager in Level 5 may perceive the need
to maintain his creditability with the central manager in
Level 4. Therefore, in order to maintain the creditability,
the incentive may be end-of-period spending cf any excesses.
That is, the local manager may approach the end of the
budget cycle with an excess of operating funds which have
not been obligated or utilized. Since he was forced to use
moral suasion in obtaining the funds initially, he may feel
that, unless he uses all of the funds, at the next cycle's
confrontation (budget request) his arguments may not be
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credible to the central manager. Thus the Level 5 incentive
may be percieved as "spend it or loose it" the next time
around. Thus, it is posited that the current CONUS-based
MHSS structure is such that there may be several operative
mechanisms which may allow the effects of perverse
endogenous incentives.
Implicit within the concept of management control is
the concept of "control". It was stated at the outset that
the responsibility structure will be more prone to emphasize
controllable costs in relation to efficiency. Although the
following may not be explicitly revealed in the structure as
presented in Figure 6, it appears that, when discussing
efficiency, it may be appropriate to discuss "control"
directly. When talking about cost of operation, costs may be
identified in a variety of ways (e.g. Fixed, variable,
indirect, controllable and non-controllable, etc.). Of
these, two concepts of cost will be used to demonstrate an
additional mechanism which, when viewed in relation to
incentives, may have additional perverse effects upon
incentives. It is similar to the "spend it or loose it"
incentive discussed above.
First, the local manager in Level 5 is given an
annual operating budget which includes both controllable and
ncn-contrcllable costs. Although he is charged with the
responsibility for seeking efficient operations and reducing
the cost of operations, the rewards generated from such
behavior may not be strong enough to elicit that same
behavior. However, an opposing responsibility is one which
is prescribed by federal statute. Section 3679 of the
Revised Statutes, as amended (31 USC 665) explicitly
prohibits any officer or employee of the United States to
make or authorize the expenditure or obligation of any
appropriation or fund for which sufficient resources are not
available. [ 46 ] Such an action is punishable under law. This
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law and its consequences are applicable to the local
managers in Level 5 in relation to their operating funds.
Due to the seriousness of such a violation, a local manager
may find that his greatest interest (thus incentive) is one
of trying to avoid incurring a "Section 3679" violation.
Therefore, it may be that subordinate managers are more
interested in avoiding the "penalty" of "not overspending"
than they are in obtaining the "rewards" of being
"efficient". The conclusion, it is posited, may be that
efficient performance within the system is not sufficiently,
if not truly, rewarded. Thus, the local manager may only
seek to control cost insofar as an "overspending" does not
occur. This incentive, coupled with the "spend it or loose
it" incentive, may in fact operate to such a degree that
true efficiency of operations may not be sought by the local
managers
.
Anthony and Herzlinger, in their text on management
control in the non-profit sector, provide a sound basis for
the logic of the following argument. They have suggested
that, on occasions in the past, managers within the federal
sector may view certain personnel resources as "free". [47]
The logic for the argument may be thus. First, federal
funding may require separate appropriations for operating
funds for personnel costs. Thus, in determining overall
personnel needs, centralized management may program for the
total system as well as budget for the specific
responsibility center. In doing so, the central manager
might determine both the quality and quantity of the
personnel mix. This then being the case, personnel costs,
for an operating manager (e.g. local manager at Level 5) may
be perceived as being non-controllable especially in the
short run. Thus, ^ince central management both determines
allowable costs for personnel and authorizes these costs,
local managers may view them as "non-controllable", and
therefore nor a true cost to their operation. For the MHSS
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this concept or argument may be strengthened by such things
as Civil Service regulations such that it extends beyond the
short run period. For example, suppose a local manager
determines that he can accomplish a task more efficiently
than it has routinely been performed with Civil Service
workers by adopting technological improvements. In doing so,
however, he must abolish a position which is filled by a
worker who, over the years, has accumulated sufficient
fringe benefits such that the local manager will be required
to expend personnel funds in that employee's behalf after he
has been separated. Perhaps this could extend beyond the
normal shcrt range period (e.g. as defined by the budget
cycle) . This then being the case, the local manager would
realize that to adopt long run cost saving measures could
perhaps require a greater expenditure of funds in the short
run. Since he is evaluated only on his performance in the
short run (e.g. a budget cycle) the reward system may force
him to perceive short run controllable costs as being
"non-controllable".
It is posited that the latter arguments actually
demonstrate another concept which is not directly or
explicitly acertainable from Figure 6. It is the concept of
centralized management. Using the above discussion as
supportive argument, it will now be suggested that a
perverse incentive may exist due to the degree of
centralized decision making which occurs for the MHSS. That
is, since the local manager may perceive that his role is
really one of custodial duties (e.g. not overspend) because
the central manager actually controls the major and marginal
decisions (e.g. personnel ceilings), his true interests may
be to supervise operations to insure that they continue to
provide for and sustain the system during current operations




2 . The Acco unting And Reporting Structure
In addition to the problems discussed with the
endogenous incentives (or their lack) within the above
structure, there may be problems associated with input
measuring for reporting and comparing productivity. A
fundamental problem may be created due to the information
system and accounting structure in which data regarding
costs and revenues are collected. In the private health care
sector there are general guidelines set down by the
Financial Accounting Standards Board, the American Hospital
Association, and other outside bodies and agencies who
possess the power or authority to influence a specific
hospital's accounting practices. It is generally difficult
to find two hospitals who perform this administrative
function in exactly the same fashion. [48] Such a diversity
gives rise to the difficulty in tracing the cost of inputs
to the units of production, both directly and indirectly.
Therefore, this quagmire of confusion further complicates
the evaluation or measurement of performance for comparative
purposes. The MHSS is similarly plagued with procedural
problems resulting in a diversity among facilities both
across a given uniformed service and between the three
branches. [ 49 ] As pointed out by the MHCS, there are broad
guidelines set forth to aid the military components in
performing the accounting functions. These guidelines are
often subject to local interpretation which eventually leads
to the differences in the way costs are collected and
reported between most facilities at the activity level. The
consequence is that, even if costs were collected by units
of output (which they are not), there would still exist a
degree of non-comparability of the units between facilities.
In the MHSS's accounting system costs are not
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collected according to any precise scheme in which either
the direct or indirect costs associated with a unit of
output (e.g. any given inpatient or outpatient) can be
readily identified, if at all. In the non-federal sector,
there is a motivation for identifying the costs associated
with the individual recipients of health care services. In
general, the health care facilities recover the cost of
resources consumed by charging a fee which is payed by the
client or a third- party payer acting on the client's behalf.
Thus, in crder to more equitably fix rates, the motivation
is to structure the accounting systems in a manner such that
it more nearly reflects the costs for the individual
patients. This same motivation is not paralleled in the
MHSS. Since the beneficiaries of the system are not reguired
to reimburse the system for resources consumed ( there are
nominal flat rate charges for boarding in direct care
facilities for several categories of beneficiaries), the
need for an accounting structure which traces costs to the
individual patient has not previously existed. Instead,
costs are collected according to a defined cost center and
in an aggregate fashion. Examples include patient care
services such as Medical and Orthopedic Services; ancillary
services such as Pharmacy and Laboratory Services; and
supportive services such as Maintenance and Patient Affairs
Divisions.
Although the direct costs at these levels are
collected relatively accurately and with precision, the
assignment or allocation of the overhead or indirect costs
may be relatively arbitrary at the various activities within
the MHSS. The overall result is an inability to identify
accurately the full costs associated with an individual
client, clinic, or service, and a non-standard cost




Moreover, the MHCS has pointed out that the
collection and reporing of workload performance data varies
across the four components in the HHSS. For example, they
point out that, in the four autonomous medical information
systems, inpatient data collection and coding varies.
CHAMPUS uses three digits of the ICDA while the military
components use four digits. Although broad guidlines for
direct care workload collection are issued by DOD, some key
areas are not addressed. They include definitions for such
things as discharge reporting data and what constitutes an
outpatient visit* Thus, there is a variability between the
four components regarding measuring and reporting procedures
at the facility level due to inconsistent interpretation of
the guidelines. Moreover, even if they were consistently
collected and reported, the specific measures employed are
questionable regarding their validity as true output
measures. The measures which are used are usually one
dimensional measures such as admissions and discharges or
numbers of service units produced. The use of such measures
requires the assumption that reported units are equivalent
from facility to facility when they are used for comparative
purposes. The assumption may not be valid, however, as it
may be clearly seen that a CBC produced by an automatic
blood processing machine is not equivalent to one determined
manually, or that an appendicitis operation is equivalent to
an influenza case in two different hospitals. Thus, it
should perhaps be apparent -hat, not only may current
measures vary because of non-standardization, but also they
may not accurately reflect relative productivity.




1 . Authority And Responsibility Structure
After having discussed the current CONUS-based MHSS,
Figure 7 is introduced below to provide the framework for
discussing a proposed structure for the MHSS when it is





































Figure 7 - HYPOTHESIZED CONUS-BASED MHSS
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Prior to discussing the management control
implications it may add clarity and authenticity fcr the
proposed structure in Figure 7 above if the appropriate
recommendations made by the MHCS are presented. The HHCS
made three specific recommendations which may have
implications regarding the responsibility structure at
Levels 3, 4 and 6. (Again, it is pointed out that the scope
of this thesis does not permit a more thorough analysis of
the full implications of these recommendations. However, a
concurrent study addressing this structure is being
performed at the Naval Postgraduate School by the BUM3D
Study Group.
)
First, Recommendation Two of the MHCS implys that a
Central Entity should be created within DOD. The study did
not (nor does this thesis) try to define the Central Entity,
but they did suggest that it should have a strong mandate
for coordinating resource allocations within the CONUS-Based
MHSS. However, a memorandum dated 28 Dec 1976 from the
Secretary of Defense Office established a DOD Health Council
which was to be composed of the following: 1) ASD(HA), who
is to serve as chairman of the council; 2) The Surgeon
General from each of the Military Departments; 3) One
representative each from the Organization of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the Uniformed Services University of the
Health Sciences. [ 50 ] Partial responsibility of the Defense
Health Council which was outlined in the memorandum included
excercising oversight of regional health care programs and
the planning, programming and evaluation of peacetime health
care delivery operations including CHAMPUS, as well as
coordination of PPBS actions. Thus, for the purposes of this
thesis, it is assumed that a Central Entity within a new
structure could be operative at an equivalent to Level 3 of
Figure 6. Next, the MHCS proposed Recommendation Three,
which suggests that a Regional Coordinator be created to
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oversee specific geographic regions within the CONUS system.
This recommendation carried minority opinions regarding the
definition of the proposed regional coordinator, but it is
assumed that, upon implementation of Capitation Budgeting,
resource allocations will be made through a Regional
Coordinator who has the authority to decide between
alternative uses of the funds at an equivalent to Level 4 in
Figure 6. For example, two or more facilities within a
region may have the potential for providing a specific
service, say OB-GYN services. At the same time, beneficiary
demand is not sufficiently large to economically justify the
provision of these services at each facility. Then, the
determination of which facility would be the one to provide
the OB-GYN services for that area's population would be a
decision for the Regional Coordinator to make. His decision
might be based, in part, upon which facility could provide
the services most efficiently, other things being equal.
The MHCS's sixth recommendation is directed to Level 6, or
the beneficiary population, and, with this, the MHCS
suggests a form of enrollement for the eligible users of the
system. Although the specific form of enrollement to be
adopted is not being recommended here, it is envisioned that
the implementation of an enrollement concept will reduce the
beneficiary member's freedom of choice once he nas opted to
enroll in a specific plan.
It may appear that these recommendations have
avoided Level 5 of Figure 6 and 7, but it is suggested that
the necessary interactions between the level 3 and 6
components will force the structure to resemble that of
Figure 7. Therefore, its implication regarding the
management control system as related to the ensuing
incentive mechanisms will be discussed.
If it can be accepted that Figure 7 may in fact
resemble a structure which could be adopted for the MHSS
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under Capitation Budgeting, then it is suggested that the
MHSS could then be viewed as a "total system" rather than
four separate and distinct health care delivery systems
(e.g. CHAMEUS, Air Force, Army, and Navy). This new
structure, or total system, could provide the foundation
wherein a performance indicator could be most productively
applied. The performance indicator, when tied to the
resource allocation structure, could create the necessary
vehicle for a resulting incentive for the managers at Level
5 as well as for the system as a whole. However, there may
be a number of assumptions which must be made for such a
total system to be operative.
First, it seems necessary to assume that total
system requirements would be determined from a projected
resource need rather than from historical workload data. The
implication of this assumption is that the resource
programming and budgeting processes would necessarily need
be initiated within Level 5 as related to the enrolled
components within Level 6. That is, from the demographic
data of the enrolled population in Level 6, the local
managers within Level 5 would form the basis for projecting
their resource requirements
.[ 51 ] This, in turn, would imply
that the local managers are actively involved in the
preparation and formulation of their budgets. This requires
the assumption that the local manager will be provided the
necessary guidance for preparation of his budget. It is
suggested that the form of the guidance may be in the
specific capitation rate which is to be set. Although it is
beyond the scope of this effort to actively pursue an
appropriate capitation rate, it is felt that it should be
recognized that the basis or level for setting capitation
rates may be a complex issue. For example, there may be at
least three levels for which capitation rates could be set.
First, the capitation rate could be set at Level 5. This of
course may imply that rates could vary between facilities.
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This would perhaps be true due to the difference in the
scope of the missions of the various facilities and/or the
demographic characteristics of the enrolled population. In
the first case, it may be necessary to recognize the
difference in costs of a teaching hospital as compared to a
non-teaching hospital. In the second case, enrolled
populations may not necessarily be normally distributed
according to the demographic characteristics which define
the level and intensity of care. The next level for which a
rate might be established would be Level 4, wherein it would
be assumed that the rate could vary between geographic
regions. Again, regional missions as well as demographic
characteristics may vary. It then naturally follows that the
final level for which the rate could be set would be at
Level 3, and this requires the assumption that a single,
overall average cost per beneficiary for the total MHSS
could be accurately determined. However, for the structure
as proposed in this thesis, it is being assumed that the
capitation rate will be set at Level 5. This rate, then,
would beccrae, in part, the guidance upon which the local
manager would develop his budget.
Next, it may be necessary to assume that, beyond
military contingency requirements, the Level 4 managers
would have the authority to define the optimal mix and/or
location of health care services to be provided within his
geographic region. That is, it is expected that unique and
specific military requirements may require that certain
functions or activities be performed. These will necessarily
be centrally determined. However, beyond these requirements,
Level 4 managers would have the capability of deciding in
which specific facility a certain health care service would
be provided. These determinations would also provide
additional guidance for budget formulation at Level 5. Then,
based upon the aggregate needs or budgets of all facilities
within a Level 5 region the total regional coordinator's
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needs would be partially determined which, in turn, would
help define the Central Entity budget, or the CONUS-based
MHSS's portion of the total DOD military health care
budget. [ 52]
Next, it may be necessary to assume that the local
managers within Level 5 will have a broader scope regarding
the management of the controllable elements of cost. It is
recognized that there may be certain functions or activities
that, although marginally controllable in nature, will be
necessary tc complement the overall effectiveness cf the
MHSS in serving the needs of the Operational Commanders. But
beyond these, if a local manager is to be charged with the
responsibility for seeking the efficient delivery of
services, then he must have the ability to influence certain
short range or controllable costs. A major implication of
this assumption may be the control of personnel costs. An
example of this has been provided in the
Capitation/Incenti ves Pro ject reports. [53] In the report,
Whipple has demonstrated how a local manager could influence
short range cost through the control over the quantity and
quality of personnel, such as with the use of physician
extenders to replace higher cost physicians in certain areas
of primary care.
Another assumption which may be necessary is that a
reward system is defined and operative in such a fashion
that both the providers and managers within the MHSS can
perceive and realize the effects of their efforts. Again, it
is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss what specific
forms these rewards may take, but the concept has been
treated more completely by Whipple in the above project
reports. However, it is suggested that if both the managers
and providers can realize a vested interest (e.g. Whipple's
goal congruence) in efficient performance, then the
likelyhood that this behavior will be elicited will be
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increased. The underlying assumption for the above is that
performance can be evaluated and compared. Moreover, it may
be necessary to assume that this performance evaluation will
encompass only those costs which are reasonably within the
control of the responsible individual. Moreover, it may
require the assumption that management efforts designed to
influence long range efficiency which will create an
increased operating cost in the short range will not
adversly reflect upon the evaluation of performance. As an
example, consider again the civil service worker who was
displaced by changing technology after having accumulated
substantial benefits. Perhaps a fund within Level 4 could be
made available wherein the cost of the accrued benefits
could be paid. Or else, in evaluating performance, these
costs would be disregarded. Moreover, it may be necessary to
assume that the use of projected resource requirements as
contrasted to historical workload budgeting will negate the
"spend it or loose it" incentive discussed earlier.
However, in a practical sense, it may require a stronger
reward over that which will be gained from particapatory
management to fully negate this latter "incentive".
There are perhaps other assumptions which are
necessary, but it is felt that a structure similar to the
above, along with the identified assumptions, at least, may
be necessary for the effective implementation of a
Capitation Budgeting system for the MHSS. This may be
especially true if the intent is to create additional
endogenous incentive mechanisms which motivate the managers
and providers toward the efficient production of health care
services for the eligible beneficiaries of the MHSS.
2 • The Accounting And Reporting Structure
In adopting all of the above conclusions under a
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Capitation Budgeting scheme, it is imperative to address the
accounting structure in its existing form. As discussed
earlier, the current accounting structure does not provide
the required degree of commonality or comparability of the
data as it is collected in the four MHSS components. This
inhibits meaningful cost and performance comparison among
the various facilities whithin the MHSS. This problem has
been recognized and presently there are ongoing efforts for
corrective action. As pointed out in the Comptroll er Notes
issued by the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) in
January 1977, the Special Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense has Recommended the development of an Uniform
Resource and Performance Accounting System for
implementation during Fiscal Year 1978. [54]
The development efforts have included thosa of a
group comprised of representatives of the three branches and
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) whose aim is
the development of a prototype operation in Fiscal Year
1979. According to the BUMED Comptroller Notes a Uniform
Chart of Accounts (UCA) is being developed. The objectives
of the UCA are as reproduced below:
Develop a standardized Tri-Service chart of
accounts (cost accounts) which encompasses common
data elements, definitions for required
performance (workload) , costs. and manpower
utilization supDorting the healrh care system.
The chart of accounts structure, insofar as is
possible, will provide commonality of data
elements among the military departments and should
facilitate comparison with cost and performance
data in the civilian health care sector, to
include the CHAMPUS.
Differences in areas where commonality is
difficult or precluded by Service or Defense
unique considerations will be identified and
methodology devised to account for and modify the
data elements for the optimum possible
comparability.
The structure must accomodate, with minimal
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changes, existing Service systems either in an
automated or manual mode.
Develop concepts and procedures to distribute
or allocate in a common manner overhead, base
support, ancillary support and similar costs
incurred in health care delivery that are not
directly costed to the inpatient and outpatient
function.
Design a standard structure to accomodate or
enhance on-going priority management needs for
information and MHCS recommendations, to include:
-Per-Capita budget concept
-Marginal cost capability
-Standardized cost and performance accounting
systems
-A tri-service Resource Management
System. [ 55 ]
As noted above, one of the objectives is to develop
an accounting structure or system such that cost data and
performance data will be standardized. Since the Uniform
Resource and Performance Accounting System is in the
development stage, only certain assumptions regarding what
this new structure will be can be addressed at this time.
There are, perhaps, some basic considerations which may be
essential changes for a successful structure to be
compatable with a sound performance measuring and reporting
system.
First, as explicitly set out in the above objectives
of the OCA, standardization of termonology, definitions, and
methodology is essential. Without these, any meaningful
comparisons between facilities cannot be made. The General
Accounting Office (GAO) , on 23 AUG 1976, reported the
results of a survey of the accounting and information
systems currently in use by the military hospitals. [ 56 ]
Their survey examined four hospitals (two Army, one each
Navy and Air Force) . It focused attention on three
functions: food services, dental services, and radiology
services. Their conclusion was that:
...these systems lack, uniformity ... and as a
result information is not available to DOD which
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could tie used to compare and evaluate hospital
budgets, costs and workloads. [ 57 ]
This, of course, also has a major implication regarding the
definition of a performance measure or indicator for the
MHSS. Therefore, in development of a measure, a reliable
standardization among the four components is essential.
Next, in considering the structure of the system, it
would seem necessary to be able to identify the full costs
associated with each cost center. This will require the
ability to identify all of the direct costs associated with
each center as well as devising the system such that, to the
extent feasible, the indirect costs are appropriately
allocated. Although estimating indirect costs may provide an
adequate basis for certain levels of planning, it is felt
that full costing of inputs to the control center or cost
center is needed if a meaningful cost per unit, however
defined, comparison is to be made. Moreover, it is
envisioned that under a Capitation Budgeting scheme, the use
of transfer prices in the reimbursement for services between
facilities may be used. For example, within a given region,
two facilities may exist such that their relative proximity
does not warrant one facility having a capability for a
certain kind of service, even though it is responsible for
all of the health care needs of its enrolled members. One
way for the hospital to obtain those services for their
clients would be to "purchase" them from the other military
facility having the needed service. Thus, the referring
hospital would be required tc reimburse the second hospital
for the resources consumed by the patient. Therefore, in
order to establish equitable transfer prices, a full cost
accounting structure may be needed. While this full costing
system is needed, the structure should also be able to
separate controllable elements from the non-controllable
elements. This may be indicated in order to interrupt the




Finally, as a consideration, it would be ideal if
the- costs of care could be traced to the identifiable
individual groups of patients who receive the care. This
should facilitate the management control process at all
levels as well as provide excellent planning information for
the allocation of resources. Initially, it may be that the
complexity and costs associated with such a system might
appear prohibitive. But upon implementation of Capitation
Budgeting and enrollment of the beneficiaries, a system with
this capability may later be a natural evolution. For
example, based upon the analysis of the sparce information
available frcm Kaiser, it may be hypothesized that the more
narrowly defined the cost collection unit, the more useful
the management information becomes. Therefore, insofar as
possible and practical, the cost accounting structure should




IV DEFINING A MHSS PERFORMANCE MEASURE
A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
At the outset it was posited that the adoption of
Capitation Budgeting as a method for allocating resources in
the MHSS will certainly not obviate the need for an
effective management control system. Moreover, it was
posited that an effective management control system within
the MHSS will require a measure of performance, an
indicator, whereby the appropriate subset of inputs-outputs
of the system can be measured and then the result be applied
within an incentve structure such that it motivates the
managers and providers to seek efficiency in their
operations.
It should perhaps be clear by now that if the MHSS
operated in a manner such that it resembled a typical
production process in the traditional non-health care market
sector, the task at hand would be relatively simple. For
example, an adequate performance indicator could perhaps be
constructed by starting with the ratio below:
(9) Inputs/Outputs
Since the primary concern is one of efficiency, and
since efficiency is defined from the relationship of the
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amount of inputs expended per unit of output, the above is a
primary requirement. To evaluate or compare performance,
however, there would be the requirement of a standard. The
most basic standard would be the expected amount of inputs
per unit of output, however derived, expressed as in the
ratio in (9) . Then, a statement of performance could perhaps
be reflected in the following manner:
(10) Actual/Expected
In model (10), the Actual would be defined by the
relationship previously established in model (9) . The
Expected in model (10) would be the relationship determined
in the specification of the standard. Then, model (10) would
become a basis for comparing a hospital to itself over time,
or for comparing one hospital to another.
In the first case, performance which proved to be as
expected, all other things equal, would result in a ratio of
one. As performance varied from the expected (the
standard) , the less efficient performance would result in a
ratio greater than one, while more efficient performance
would be less than one. For inter-hospital comparisons
then, it would be a simple task of identifying the
relatively efficient performer by ranking the hospitals
according to their index value. The more efficient
performance would be reflected in a lower index value.
Although this simple approach would provide the basis for
evaluating productivity, it does require that the structure
in which it is applied provide the basic incentive for
efficient production, for the measurement itself does not
contain an inherent or endogenous motivating factor. In the
traditional market sector, the motivating factor is provided
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in the form of the reward and penalty system of profit.
Although the above is not directly adaptable within the
MHSS, the basic logic underlying the analogy is. However,
as the review in the previous sections has demonstrated,
there are three basic categories of problems to be addressed
before such an approach could be adopted in the MHSS. The
categories are the measurement of inputs, the measurement of
outputs in relation to the inputs, and the application of
the resulting measurements in an incentive structure.
Therefore, it will be the purpose of this section to
directly address these problem areas with the intent of
identifying an acceptable performance indicator.
Prior to discussing a specific indicator or measure of
productivity, however, it may be more appropriate to discuss
the incentive structure. It has been demonstrated that, in
the private health care sector, one method for circumventing
the absence of an incentive for efficiency is to tie the
reimbursement for services rendered by a hospital, in some
fashion cr another, to that hospital's relative efficiency
(or a demonstration of a desire for efficiency ) . The
reimbursing agencies were, in general, applying the reward
and penalty approach with the intent of reducing or
containing total cost (or the cost per patient illness). In
theory, it seems the basic attempt was to force the
individual facilities to seek their optimal input-output
combinations such that they would be operating at the output
level which would minimize their LRAC. Although there were
questions raised regarding the equity of such an approach
and the difficulty of implementimg such an approach, at
least one researcher's evidence suggested that the reward
and penality approach of reimbursement may in fact favorably
influence the long run average cost (or efficiency) of an
institution. [ 58 ] And, for the MHSS, if it can be assumed
that when each individual facility is operating on the
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minimum point of its LRAC curve, then the MHSS, as a whole,
will be operating on the minimum point of its LRAC curve,
then there may be adequate justification for creating an
endogeneous incentive structure which operates on a reward
and penality system whose sanctions depend upon efficiency.
From a total system perspective, however, there may be
occasions when higher management (e.g. at Level 3 or higher)
will have to consider suboptimization in a component or
facility in order to optimize the overall effectiveness of
the total system (e.g. contingency requirements and/or
specific operational requirements of the Line are perhaps
examples which would require the addition of a function or
service at a given facility which would be the constraining
factor). Therefore, it is being suggested that: 1) Total
system efficiency must be that which is considered within
relevant constraints; and 2) The reward and penalty system
should operate such that it will recognize the constraints
reguiring sutoptimization.
When considering implementation of a reward and penalty
system in order to provide an incentive for efficiency, it
can be seen that there may be structural changes which are
necessary. The examination of the current CONUS-based MHSS
has revealed that the present historical workload budgeting
approach for allocating resources along with its related
authority and responsibility structure, may preclude
implementation of an adequate reward system. Moreover, due
to the fragmentation which exists within the structure, the
implementation of an effective management control system
which would allow seeking total system efficiency (e.g. such
as intra-componen t trade-offs wherein the optimal mix of
facilities and the optimal mix of services within a given
facility are goals) would be difficult. Moreover, due to the
relative degree of centralization which could exist, a total
committment by the Level 5 managers and providers to the
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objective of efficiency may be difficult to attain.
Therefore. because of these inherent structural and
management implications, a framework within which an
incentive mechanism could be established was hypothesized.
This hypothetical structure (see Figure 7) , it is posited,
could provide the basis for reducing the fragmentation and,
in a large part, the ensuing difficulties. Thus, it is
suggested that, due to the management process itself, no
measure of performance, regardless of how accurately it
reflects true operations, will be an effective management
tool in and cf itself. On the contrary, perhaps a less
accurate performance measure may in fact be a more effective
management tool if it is adopted and applied consistently
with sound, basic management principles. This is contrasted
with a "perfect measure" being used but where basic
management principals are violated or ignored. Therefore, it
is now suggested that: 1) A performance indicator must be,
above all else, compatible to the structure within which it
is to be applied if it is expected to elicit efficiency as
well as reflect efficiency; and 2) The more accurate the
performance indicator, the more effective it will be as a
management tcol. Therefore, the following discussion will
address performance measurement within the MHSS given these
two perspectives, assuming a structure relatively similar to
that hypothesized in Figure 7.
B. TKE MEASUREMENT OF INPUTS
It may be elementary to mention that a first crucial
step in the measurement process is the identification and
measurement of the inputs to the system. No measure which
fails to address this issue can be expected to accurately
reflect absclute or relative efficiency for comparative
purposes. Both the MHCS and the GAO have demonstrated the
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nature of the existing problems facing the MHSS at the time
of their analysis in regard to the measurement of inputs.
Basically, the MHSS did not have a compatable system in
which costs could be adequately compared. Therfore, the
first step in identifying a performance indicator will be
the standardization of the accounting and reporting systems
within the four separate components of the MHSS. Without a
common data base from which cost (and productivity) is to be
measured, an effective comparison of the performances within
the MHSS cannot be made. As discussed earlier, this problem
has been recognized and a solution is being sought.
Therefore, it will be necessary to assume that the
accounting structure will provide the necessary standardized
data. Moreover, in order to relate the performance indicator
to an incentive system, it is being assumed that the
appropriate costs (e.g. controllable costs) can be
segregated and traced to an appropriate set of cost
objectives or centers. Although managers at all levels will
retain an interest in the total cost of operation, when they
are interested in efficiency they should perhaps be able to
concentrate their attention to the area of controllable
costs. Since managers or producers cannot in fact control
the "non-controllable" cost of operations (e.g. those costs
which were discussed within the context of suboptimization)
,
they should neither be rewarded nor penalized for these
costs. Because of the possible adverse effects upon
incentives in the system which may be realized from failure
to separate these costs elements, it may be indicated that
the new accounting structure provide a standard methodology
for making this distinction. A corresponding concept is,
that for the controllable costs, responsible managers and
providers should be held accountable for the costs.
Moreover, in being held accountable, they should have the
authority to control the elements of input which generate
the cost. Then, based upon efficiency, adequate
justification would exist for applying sanctions. Although
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this may appear obvious, it is being suggested that for an
incentive mechanism to be functional, a manager and provider
must have the ability as well as the motivation to reduce
the total amount of controllable costs within his realm of
authority.
C. THE MEASUREMENT OF OUTPUTS
Again, it is elementary to point out that the next
crucial step will be relating the inputs to the outputs of
the system. As was stated earlier, there is no generally
accepted methodology for measuring the output of any health
care system. Therefore, due to this lack, the MHSS will be
forced to resort to surrogate measures for output when
creating a performance indicator. This, of course, is a
major complicating factor in constructing an adequate
measure of productivity. If true output was easily
measurable, then an adequate indication could be determined
by starting from the ratio in the proposed model (9) . The
development of this model depends upon output specification.
Thus, it is essential that a surrogate measure for output be
identified. But in the selection of surrogate measures,
there may be several problems. For example, Anthony and
Herzlinger have pointed out that, in the selection of a
surrogate, caution must be exercised to insure that the
surrogate does not become an objective in and of itself. [59]
As has been seen, the CWQ, as a surrogate for output, can
become an objective for the managers in Level 5. That is, in
order to justify future operating funds, the local managers
may attempt to maximize their CWU and thereby relegate the
objective for efficiency to a lower priority. Also, it has
been seen that the Newhouse and Taylor suggestion for a VCI
may operate similarly. That is, when the VCI is used to
classify a given hospital into an expense rating group, the
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manager could seek to improve his hospital's position and in
doing so ignore efficiency. Onder given conditions, managers
could allow cost to rise and, as a result, improve their
standing in relation to other hospitals. Therefore, because
of the possibility that a surrogate measure can become an
objective which is in conflict with the objective of
efficiency, it is important that the surrogate be free as
possible of characteristics which would allow manipulation
by managers.
The traditional one dimensional measures, such as
patient days, occupied bed days, admissions and discharges
may contain an inherent problem if used for comparative
purposes. That is, in comparing the admission of patients,
it must be assumed that they are equivalent admissions. It
should be apparent that this assumption may be invalid.
Therefore, because of this lack of homogeniety, any
surrogate which is selected should provide a basis for
adjusting for the differences among the output of
facilities. Because hospitals may vary according to both
their incuts (e.g. quality) and the demands (e.g. case mix
and complexity of cases) , several methodologies for
adjusting were examined. Basically, the methods centered
arcund either grouping hospitals according to some scheme or
else adjusting through the use of some statistical measure,
or both.
Grouping hospitals according to some scheme relys upon
the assumption that similar inputs imply similar outputs
(e.g. case mix and complexity are similarly distributed in
the facilities). Moreover, grouping usually assumes that as
hospitals add services and additional capabilities, the
nature of the output may vary. Moreover, grouping is usually
accomplished according to a scheme of size (e.g. beds),
teaching status or affiliations, and/or by kinds of services
available. The necessary assumptions may not be
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consistently valid. For example, a given MHSS hospital may
not have a service capability identified in its formal
organization or service classifications (e.g. Inhalation
Therapy) . let, even in the absence of this formal
"capability", a hospital might be able to provide a limited
quantity cf this kind of output. Therefore, the grouping of
hospitals, as a singular methodology, may not be an
appropriate solution for the MHSS for adjusting case mix and
complexity. Even in light of this, it may still be indicated
to rely upcn grouping facilities according to some scheme.
For example, it is being assumed that within Level 5 there
may be seme relatively isolated ambulatory care facilities
which may be required to provide a substantial amount of
rather comprehensive outpatient treatment. These facilities,
although dependent upon a major treatment facility for
complex care, may be required to provide such services since
it would be most convenient for the patient. That is,
perhaps a patient requires only Physical Therapy treatments
which would otherwise require admission if not available at
his local dispensary. Due exclusively to the patient's own
convenience, the facility might be required to maintain the
capability for that kind of service. Yet, perhaps another
set of circumstances might find the patient residing near a
dispensary and the hospital at the same time. In that case,
it would neither benecessary to admit the patient nor to
require the local dispensary to maintain the capability of
the service. Thus, when comparing the two dispensaries
respectively, it could be expected that the overall or
average cost for providing outpatient care would be higher
in the first situation, other things being equal. This same
logic could perhaps be applied to hospitals as well, due to
expected savings (efficiency) from the economies of scale.
By recalling the analogy which contrasted a CBC being
performed manually versus by automation, it may be suggested
that there will be circumstances such as this which, due to
cost-effective consideration as a result of volume, will
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perhaps allcw one hospital to be more cost-effective due to
economies of scale. Therefore, because of these type of
circumstances, it may still be necessary to group facilities
in some fashion for the purpose of adjusting the particular
circumstances and not just case mix.
However, since a grouping methodology alone may not be
expected to make all of the necessary adjustments, it may
still be necessary to employ a methodology which will
further aid in discriminating by case mix and complexity. In
assuming model (9) as tne essential relationship to be
developed, it is suggested that the output measure must be
addressed in two ways: 1) First, the specific measure which
is to reflect output (the surrogate) must be identified; 2)
Then, the specific approach for adjusting must be selected.
For example, in looking at the proposal offered by Edwards,
an approach which incorporates the adjustment factors (e.g.
case mix, size, teaching status, etc.) while defining the
surrogate for output has been reviewed. One major advantage
to be found in the Edwards' model, the Synthesized Case
(SC) , is that the hospital product incorporates ambulatory
care. This is often ignored by other measures such as has
been the case with all other methodologies which were
reviewed, except for the CWU. If overall efficiency is being
sought, then the measure for productivity should reflect
ambulatory care. Since it is generally accepted that the
cost of delivering ambulatory care is relatively less
expensive than hospitalization, the measure should provide
an incentive to deliver health care at the most appropriate
level. And in the case of the military, Whipple has
demonstrated that a combination of factor substitution and
ambulatory care could provide an area for significant
savings in the delivery of health care services to the MHSS
beneficiaries. [ 60 ] But with incorporating ambulatory care
in the output proxy, we have seen that the CWU provided a
perverse incentive. This might be the case with the Edwards
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SC model. Ey recalling his model (8), it can be seen that
there may be an incentive to allow outpatient revenue (OPR)
to rise. This incentive may be contrary to the intent. For
example, since OPR is generated from ambulatory care, it may
be assumed that there would be a direct impact upon
inpatient utilization (e.g. upon C or IPR) . That is, by
treating more patients in the ambulatory care mode, OPR
would rise relative to IPR, assuming that an increase in
ambulatory care would mean a decrease in total admissions.
Although this may be the case, it is not necessarily so. On
the contrary, it is suggested that a manager, in order to
improve the evaluation of his productivity (e.g.
relationship of inputs to outputs) , might have the incentive
to allow the average charge of an outpatient visit to rise
while holding all other factors constant. This would improve
his hospital product in that it would reflect a higher
output. Then, holding total cost constant, relative
productivity would improve in that it would appear that the
unit cost per hospital product would decrease. Thus, the
incentive becomes one of raising outpatient charges and not
necessarily that of seeking a less expensive mode for
delivering care. Although the MHSS would be reguired to use
average cost instead of average charge or revenue, the use
of the SC as an output surrogate might not provide an
adequate measure for indexing productivity. For example, by
allowing total cost to rise proportionally to outpatient
cost, while holding all other factors constant, a hospital
manager could maintain a stable productivity index. That
is, as outpatient costs rise, SC will rise proportionally to
total cost. The resulting ratio between the inputs (total
cost) and the outputs (SC) would be a constant, other things
equal. Therefore, even if it may be an improvement over the
CWU in that the perverse incentive disappears, there may be
a lack of an incentive for controlling the cost of
ambulatory care. This latter, it would appear, may not be
compatable with an incentive for factor substitution in the
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ambulatory care mode. Moreover, several of the variables
used by Edwards may be questionable. For example, the use of
SMSA and the profit classification of a hospital may not be
applicapble to the MHSS. Therefore, to adopt his model
would require a thorough validation based exclusively upon
MHSS data. Thus due to the questionable varables and
possibly the inherent manipulability , the SC may not be an
adequate methodology for specifying output for developing a
productivity index for the MHSS.
Other measures have relied upon selected weights or
statistical composites in adjusting the case mix factor. For
example, recall that Roguski reviewed three approaches
wherein diagnostic category, hospital service, and
diagnostic indices were used. The diagnostic category method
dependended primarily upon simple averages of patient days
while the hospital service approach depended primarily upon
the simple average of patients (discharges) for each
service. Neither of these approaches seem to offer an
adequate specification of output for the MHSS. The
diagnostic index approach, however, might provide a
reasonable approach in specifying output if the measure
included ambulatory care, which it does not. Since the
specific weight chosen was ALOS, it seems reasonable to
assume that it would be difficult to include ambulatory care
in the model. This, again, would appear to limit its
usefulness for the MHSS.
The CPHA proposal for an A5V and a RNO both depend upon
an information system -that can trace charges to individual
patients or disease categories. For the MHSS, a methodology
using this approach would require the ability to trace costs
to individual diagnostic categories or patients. Although
the capability of the cost accounting structure being
developed at this time is unknown, the new system may
provide this capability. But, even with assuming this
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capability, the CPHA proposal is still deficient in that it
too ignores ambulatory care. Moreover, using an average
costing method, regardless of the surrogate output measure
selected, contains an inherent difficulty in that it does
not provide a true standard from which a productivity index,
such as model (10), can be constructed. That is, as
previously discussed, all hospitals could maintain a
relatively stable ranking from the productivity index by
allowing their average costs to rise proportionally to each-
other. Moreover, this relative comparison of hospitals
essentially assumes that the overall average cost derived
from the base is an optimal cost. That is, in the absence of
a pre-set' standard against which the overall average can be
evaluated, there is no way to determine if this overall
average is a "high" average or a "low" average.
D. A RECOMMENDED METHODOLOGY
Therefore, based upon these arguments, it is suggested
that the above methodologies may not be entirely
satisfactory for defining an index which is to depict
productivity within the MH5S. However, there may be another
approach for developing the model (10) . The approach, which
is to be described below, will depend upon the capability of
answering the basic question: Given a particular set of
observed activities occured at a hospital during a relevant
period, what should that hospital have spent in performing
those activities?
In its most simple form as ACTUAL COST/EXPECTED COST, an
index is created which provides an answer to the basic
question while at the same time: 1) Provides a standard (the
Expected Cost) ; 2) It will adjust for case mix; 3) Provide a
measure of relative efficiency of a hospital to itself and
85

to other hospitals; 4) Provide, as based upon the standards,
planning information for all levels of management; and 5) If
tied to a reward/penalty system, provide an incentive for
seeking efficiency.
The major problem of the proposal to follow is the
complexity inherent in identifying "expected cost" of the
activities to be evaluated. It perhaps should be made
explicit that expected cost as herein defined is not
necessarily interchangable with "budgeted funding". The
expected cost of the denomenator is actually dexermined from
the various activities performed by the facility during the
relevant period. For clarification consider the following:
STEP CNE
The first step would be to identify the range of
possible activities that could be performed in any military
hospital. The total range of activities might be specified
as as the vector X = (X , X , . . . X ) , where X is the
1 2 n i
number of units of care in activity group i performed in the
target hospital in a specified period. For capitation
budgeting versus workload budgeting these units would be
based on the catchment population characteristics and size
and not on the maximum number which were performed. For
management purposes, these activities could be grouped into
categories as necessary (e.g. those associated with military
requirements which are felt to be non-controllable, those
relevant to the treatment of the enrolled beneficiaries, and
those associated with training, etc.).
STEP TWO
Once the full range of possible activities has been
specified, it would be necessary to identify the expected
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cost associated with one unit of each individual type of
activity. Although this may appear to be a highly complex
process, it is being assumed that this capability will exist
within a Capadation Budgeting information system. It is
clear that the data necessary to implement the standards
will have to be developed. However, it is envisioned that a
Capitation Eudgeting system which depends upon projected
workload derived from demographic characteristics of an
enrolled population would perhaps ultimately consider the
cost associated with the various activities necessary to
deliver health care services. Therefore, it may be
reasonable tc assume that this data could be available in
the future. Once the expected cost is determined, it would
become the coefficient to be applied against the respective
X . That is the cost of producing one unit of any X would
i i
be a function of the cost of the inputs needed to perform
that activity. The total range of unit costs could be
specified asY =Y,Y,...Y
i 1 2 n
STEP THREE
Once the range of possible activities along with the
standard or expected cost of performing one unit of the
activities has been identified, then the denominator of the
proposed index could be determined. That is, the total
expected cost for a given hospital over a relevant period
would be the sum of the products of the expected cost times
the number of units of each activity performed, or:




The final step would be relatively simple. In forming
the numerator of the ratio, the total expenses under
consideration would be accumulated. Then the measure of
productivity becomes:
(12) PI = ACP/Y X ;
i i
where I = Unit Cost
i
X = Unit Activity
i
ACP = Actual Cost of the Period
PI = Productivity Index
There are perhaps several qualities regarding this
approach which will further enhance its attractiveness. To
begin, with adequate specification of the standards, the
measure is relatively easily constructed. Since it depends
upon a discrete category of activities which have been
performed, it is suggested that it will provide a relatively
easy data collection effort. Moreover, it will be just as
easily understood by the managers and providers, and it will
provide them with information for comparing their individual
performances. That is, since the activities can be traced to
individual departments or services, a set of internal
indices can be formed and thereby provide the local manager
with a tool for evaluating his own operations. Moreover,
depending upon the speed of the accounting and reporting
system, relatively timely feedback can be provided for
monitoring current operations. Another area in which it is
favorable is that it will not be easily manipulated. That
is, since there is a set of standards from which the index
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is created, unjustified variance from the standards will be
highly visitle. The greatest area for abuse will probably
appear at the initial data collection stage. However, this
is an area for aanagement of personnel, and this area will
be subject to inaccuracy regardless of the methodology
selected. Moreover, with the specification of the activities
which are considered "non-controllable", it will be
relatively easy to remove those from the measure, with the
assumption that they met the standard. Moreover,
specification of the standards will enhance planning and
budgeting at Level 3, 4, and 5 in the hypothesized MHSS
struct ur e.
Even with the above recognized advantages, it is
anticipated that there may be valid arguments raised
concerning the approach. For example, beyond the inherent
difficulties associated with the complexity in identifying
the standards, using a constant coefficient (Y ) assumes a
i
linear relationship over all ranges of output, when in fact
there may be economies of scale such that the expected cost
for a given activity might be more properly expressed as a
non-linear relationship between the Y and the X , such as
i i
a
(Y ) (X ) . That is, the average cost per unit of output
i i
might decrease as volume of output increases. Therefore, it
may be necessary to rely upon a scheme for grouping
hospitals or facilities according to some peer grouping
plan, such as the Berry method. Moreover, although providing
for case mix adjustment, the approach may not be able to
discriminate individual case complexity. Since it is
possible that justified deviations from the standard may in
fact occur, other methods for identifying this might be
sought. This justification, it is suggested, would have to
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come from outside the model. Another problem which may be
encountered is that there may be no incentive to reduce the
number of activities performed. Since the incentive is
constructed such that it induces the managers and providers
to perform an activity efficiently, there is no natural
incentive to prevent the manager or provider from performing
a "mountain of efficiency". Therefore, it may be necessary
to depend upon a second measure to insure that "what was
performed is what should have been performed". This measure
could be determined from the per capita cost associated with
the enrolled population. For example, it is assumed that
Capitation Budgeting implies that a given amount of
resources per enrolled beneficiary will be funded. Then,
based upon the amount of total cost for the relevant period,
a local manager's variance from the expected per capita cost
could be determined. This would provide the second measure
which will contain the necessary incentive for containing or
reducing total cost. The ratio would be defined as:
(13) PCI = ACC/BCC;
where PCI = Per Capita Index
ACC = Actual Cost Per Capita
BCC = Budgeted Cost Per Capita
The final measure upon which the reward/penalty
sanctions would be based would then be a combination of the
PI index and the PCI index which were developed in the
ratios in models (12) and (13), or:
(14) FM = (PI) x (PCI) ;
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where PM = Performance Measure
This final measure (PM) , it is suggested, contains the
inherent incentives such that, when they are employed under
a reward system structured within a MHSS as hypothesized
from Figure 7, there will tend to be a motivation for the
managers and providers to seek the efficient modes of
delivering health care services to the eligible




It is clear that the adoption of Capitation Budgeting
within the MHSS will (still) require an effective management
control system. Moreover/ for an efficient system to exist,
there will be a need to create an incentive system for
efficient delivery of care, and then provide a basis for
rewarding efficient performance. This requires an effective
method for identifying productivity, but since output
measurement of health care is difficult, management must
rely upon input or process measures. The use of these as
surrogates provides a challenging problem which has been
addressed in multitude of approaches by health care
economists. Since there appeared to be no completely
ccmpatable solution which could be directly adopted by the
MHSS at this time, a rather complex proposal has been
suggested. The proposal itself is not perfect, but it
appears to capture the essential elements necessary for
measuring relative productivity and provide the incentives
which will motivate efficiency. Because of its several
advantages, it is recommended as one of perhaps several
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